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PARTIES 
Some of the individuals and entities identified in the section entitled "Parties" of 
the Brief of Appellant are not properly before the Court. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 1-2) 
The district court correctly concluded that the operative complaint is the Second 
Amended Complaint.1 [R.03 595] The individuals and entities named in Plaintiffs' 
Joint/Consolidated Notice of Appeal [R.03857-03858], and the Brief of Appellants, 
include eleven ( 11) individuals and entities who are not identified in the Second 
Amended Complaint. [R.004 77] It appears that Appellants listed the individuals and 
entities appearing in their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint [R.02568], which the 
district court denied leave to file. As such, there are at least eleven (11) individuals and 
entities who are not properly before the Court. Without waiving Appellees' objection to 
Appellants having named individuals and entities not properly before the Court, for 
purposes of clarity, reference to "Plaintiffs", refers to Appellants. 
The Plaintiffs have identified Robert Brazell, In Store Broadcasting Network, 
LLC, In Store Broadcasting Holdings, LLC, IBN Media, LLC, InTouch LLC, InTouch 
Media, LLC, Talos Partners, LLC, Von Whitby, Robert W. Kasten Jr., Robert E. Riley, 
and Robin Nebel as the Appellees. (Appellants' Brief, p. 2). The defendants in the 
Second Amended Complaint, i.e., the operative ~omplaint in this case, names the 
following individuals and entities: Robert V. Brazell, In-Store Broadcasting Network, 
LLC, In-Store Broadcasting Holdings, LLC, IBN Media, LLC In-Touch, LLC, In-Touch 
1 The issue of whether the Second Amended Complaint is the operative complaint is not 
in dispute and not on appeal. 
1 
Media, LLC, Talos Partners, LLC, Von Whitby, Robert W. Kasten Jr., Robert E. Riley, 
Robin Nebel, Rob Wolf, Mark Oleksik, and DOES 1-15. [R.00477] Plaintiffs have not 
named Mark Oleksik as an Appellee, even though he was a named party in the Second 
Amended Complaint. [Id.] The district court dismissed Plaintiffs claims against Robert E. 
Riley, Robin Nebel, and Rob Wolf. [R.03885, R.03955] Plaintiffs have not appealed 
those dismissals. [R.03857-03858] Appellees Robert V. Brazell, In-Store Broadcasting, 
LLC, In-Store Broadcasting Holdings, LLC, IBN Media, LLC, InTouch LLC, InTouch 
Media LLC, Talos Partners, LLC, and Robert W. Kasten Jr., are referred to herein as the 
"IBN Defendants". The IBN Defendants are also counterclaimants, pursuant to a 
counterclaim filed June 14, 2013, and which is proceeding to trial in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)G), and 
78A-3-102(4) as to the parties properly before the Court. As set forth above, there are 
parties named in the Brief of Appellants, who were not proper parties in the district court 
action. This Court does not have jurisdiction over those individuals and entities. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue No. 1: Did the Trial Court Err in Denying Leave to Amend? The standard 
of review is whether the district court clearly abused its discretion to deny Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Leave to File Fifth Amended Complaint ("Motion to Amend"". Under that 
standard, the district court's decision will not be reversed unless it exceeds the limits of 
reasonability. See Caro/es v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, ,r 16, 79 P.3d 974 (citing 
2 
Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 1994), quoting Crossland Sav. v. Hatch, 877 
·>$) P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994)) (omitting other citations). 
Issue No. 2: Plaintiffs assert that the "Trial Co_urt Err[ ed] in Finding the Proposed 
Amended Complaint Lacked Particularity Under Utah Rule Civil Procedure 9(b )?" 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 2) The standard of review applicable to the district court's decision 
to grant the IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness without deference to the district court. See Caro/es, 2003 UT App 339, ,r 15 
(citing Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ,r 2, 20 P.3d 895). 
Issue No. 3: Plaintiffs assert that the "Trial Court Err[ed] in Applying Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 9(b) to Claims of Constructive ·Fraud (Insolvency) Under the Utah 
Fraudulent Transfer Act." (Appellants' Brief, p. 3) Plaintiffs have not alleged or put. 
forth a claim for "Constructive Fraud (Insolvency) Under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer 
Act", in either their Second Amended Complaint or their proposed Fifth Amended 
Complaint [R.00477-R.00493, R.02567-02640]. In addition, the issue of whether such a 
claim should be reviewed under the standards of Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was not raised at the district court level [R.0475, R.02518-02524, R.02646-
02659, R.02666-02673, R.02675-02678, R.02685-02691, R.02698-02703, R.02743-
02753, R.02944-02946, R.02954-02956, R.02959-02973, R.03002-03004, R.03053-
03061]. · 
The Court should decline to consider the issue and arguments, because they were 
not properly preserved for appellate review. See Seamons v. Brandley, 2011 UT App. 
434, ,r,r 2-3, 268 P.3d 195 (per curiam) ("[l]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, the 
3 
issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an 
opportunity to rule on that issue," (quoting 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,r 
51, 99 P.3d 801); (further quoting Easy Heat for the proposition that in order to property 
preserve an issue for appeal "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue 
must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant authority." Id.)). Further, Plaintiffs have not put forth any reason 
why exceptional circumstances exist or that plain error occurred, such that this Court 
should consider this issue notwithstanding Plaintiffs' failure to preserve this issue at the 
district court level. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 11, 10 P. 3d 346 (stating that the 
"preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a 
defendant demonstrates that exceptional circumstances exist or that plain error 
occurred"). 
IMPORTANT STATUTES AND RULES 
As a supplement to Plaintiffs' Addendum, copies of the following rules and 
statutes are included in the Addenda attached hereto: 
A. Rules 9, 12 and 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are in included in 
the addenda attached hereto. 
B. Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code§§ 25-5-1, et seq. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves forty-six ( 46) named Plaintiffs, who brought claims against the 
IBN Defendants and other defendants. The Plaintiffs' allege the following claims in their 
4 
Second Amended Complaint: (1) violation of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, (2) 
fraudulent misrepresentation, (3) fraudulent inducement and rescission, ( 4) promissory 
estoppel, (5) civil conspiracy, and (6) common-law fraud. The gist of the Plaintiffs' 
allegations is that they invested in the In-Store Broadcasting entities based on Defendant 
Robert Brazell' s allegedly false representations. Plaintiffs' allegations, however, fail to 
state or describe the basic facts explaining when or how any individual Plaintiff was 
induced to invest or any representations by any· single Defendant of a then presently 
existing fact, which any Defendant knew to be false at the time made. Over a period of 
23 months, Plaintiffs made multiple attempts to cure their complaint. They were unable 
to do so. The district court, therefore, properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Motion Amend, and 
granted the IBN Defendants' Rule l 2(b )( 6) Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice ("Motion 
to Dismiss"). The district court properly concluded that "[s]ix tries at pleading fraud are 
enough". 
In an effort to defend against Plaintiffs' nebulous claims, the IBN Defendants 
served written discovery on Plaintiffs. Six months later, the IBN Defendants received 
responses that were only signed or verified by one Plaintiff, Steve Brazell, who, 
curiously, attempted to sign for the rest of the Plaintiffs. The IBN Defendants, on the 
other hand, have responded to hundreds of discovery requests propounded by the 
Plaintiffs. The parties took depositions of Steve Brazell and Robert Brazell. The time for 
discovery closed long before IBN filed its Motion to Dismiss. In short, any assertion by 
Plaintiffs that this case is in the "early stages" and that allowing them to file their legally 
5 
insufficient proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, would not be futile or highly prejudicial 
to the IBN Defendants, is simply not true. 
The Plaintiffs' misplaced reliance on Plaintiff Steve Brazell signing and verifying 
written discovery requests directed to each of them, together with their numerous 
attempts to amend their complaint is illustrative of the fundamental problem with their 
case; the Plaintiffs have improperly treated this as a class action, without any basis for 
doing so. The district court recognized this in its ruling, stating: 
This is not a class action. Each plaintiff will have made individual decisions 
as to buying and holding stock in this case. Each defendant played different 
roles~ We are dealing with separate fraud actions pursued by each proposed 
plaintiff against various defendants. Particularity is required as to each of 
these claims. . . . Each time the Plaintiffs attempted to cure their legally 
insufficient complaint, they failed to recognize this principle-their 
proposed Fifth Amended Complaint is no exception. 
[R.03596] 
After carefully reviewing the Proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, the district 
court properly denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend. The basis for the district court's 
decision was that the Plaintiffs' motion was untimely, "coming long after both the 
[c]ourt-imposed deadline for amendment as well as that stipulated by the parties", and 
would substantially prejudice the IBN Defendants as. they ''would now be faced with new 
factual theories for which they have not had time to prepare." [R.03595] In addition, and 
most importantly, the district court determined that granting the motion would be futile, 
because the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint "still fail[ ed] to plead a fraud claim by 
any specific plaintiff against any specific defendant with the particularity required by 
Rule 9(b)." [Id.] The district court concluded that the proposed complaint was "long on 
6 
narrative and short on specifics with respect to each individual party [. . . , and] does not 
explain when any false representation was made to any individual plaintiff, or any 
plaintiffs specific reliance on that statement." [R.03596] The district court also properly 
concluded that the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint was deficient because it "does not 
permit any one defendant to determine which supposed misrepresentation of fact was 
relied on by which plaintiff in what way, and why each defendant should be charged with 
that alleged misrepresentation." [R.3 596] 
In sum, the district court properly dismissed this case and denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend, because even after six attempts to cure their complaint, Plaintiffs have 
not been able to put forth critical facts, which they should have known when they filed 
their initial complaint, their First Amended Complaint, and their Second Amended 
Complaint. The only logical conclusion after six unsuccessful attempts to cure their 
complaint, is that there is no set of facts sufficient to support Plaintiffs' claims. As such, 
the district court properly concluded to dismiss their complaint, with prejudice. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION IN DISTRICT COURT 
A. Complaints and Answers 
The Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on February I, 2013. [R.0001-
R.000 15] Concurrent with the filing of the original complaint commencing this Action, 
Plaintiff Steve Brazell created a defamatory website located at www.worstceos.com (the 
"Website") [R. 00146 at 1 22, R. 00166], through his company and Co-counterclaim 
Defendant, Hitman, Inc., on which he published the complaint (as well as subsequent 
7 
proposed amendments to the Complaint, including the proposed Fifth Amended 
Complaint), and has continued to selectively publish other developments in this case. [R. 
00146 at ,r 22, R.00146-0014 7] The First Amended Complaint was answered by 
Defendant Rob Wolf on June 3, 2013. [R.00106-R.00124] The IBN Defendants answered 
the First Amended Complaint on June 14, 2013, and asserted counterclaims against 
Plaintiffs. [R.00130-R.00154] On August 12, 2013, Defendant Mark Oleksik answered 
Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. [R.00390-R.00393] Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
Defendant Steve Brazell (hereafter, "Plaintiff Steve Brazell") answered the IBN 
Defendants' counterclaim on July 5, 2013. [R.00301-R.00307] On July 23, the IBN 
Defendants moved for leave to file an amended counterclaim and to add a third party 
complainant, [R.00356], which was unopposed by Plaintiffs [R.00362], which the district 
court granted on November 6, 2013. The Plaintiffs moved for leave to file their Second 
Amended Complaint on August 6, 2013 [R.00365], which the district court granted on 
August 30, 2013. [R.00459] On September 3, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Second 
Amended Complaint. [R.00476, R.00493] 
The IBN Defendants filed a First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint against Third-Party Defendant Daniel Kondos on January 17, 2014. [R.00966, 
R.01013] 
On May 29, 2014, Defendant Von Whitby filed an answer to Plaintiffs' Third 
Amended Complaint [R.0 1888], which was filed without leave _of the district court. On 
July 18, 2014, Defendant Von Whitby filed an answer to the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended 
Complaint [R.02139], which was filed without leave of the district court. On September 
8 
~I 
4, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed an objection to the Plaintiffs having filed a Fourth 
Amended Complaint without leave of the district court. (R.02367] On September 16, 
2014, the district court noted that the Fourth Amended Complaint was not authorized, 
and that there was no reason to file an answer. [R.02389] 
IBN Defendants' counterclaims against Plaintiffs Steve Brazell and his company, 
Hitman, Inc. continue at the district court level. 
B. Motions 
On June 14, 2013, the IBN Defendants filed a motion for a temporary restraining 
order and a preliminary injunction. [R.00174] On June 17, 2013, the district court denied 
a temporary restraining order, and scheduled a hearing for July 3, 2013. [R.00235] The 
IBN Defendants withdrew their motion for temporary restraining orders on June 25, 
2013. [R.00293] 
On June 21, 2013 the Plaintiffs filed a motion for expedited discovery. [R.00267] 
The district court did not sign Plaintiffs' proposed form of order, and found that in light 
of the IBN Defendants' withdrawal of its motion for a preliminary injunction, the motion 
was moot. [R.00290] 
The IBN Defendants filed a motion for extraordinary discovery, and a motion to 
compel and for sanctions against certain plaintiffs on November 12, 2013. [R00543] On 
November 22, 2013, the IBN Defendants filed a supplemental motion to compel 
discovery and for sanctions against certain plaintiffs. [R.00622] Plaintiffs opposed the 
motions on November 26, 2013. [R.00686] Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for 
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extraordinary discovery, to compel discovery, and for sanctions on November 26, 2013, 
[R.00686], which Plaintiffs withdrew on December 17, 2013. [R.00846] 
Defendant Mark Oleksik filed a motion for a protective order on December 6, 
2013. [R.00765] On December 20, 2013, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendant Mark 
Oleksik's motion for a protective order. [R.00854] Defendant Mark Oleksik filed a reply 
in support of his motion for protective order on December 30, 2013. [R.00863] A notice 
to submit was not filed. 
On December 12, 2013, Defendant Mark Oleksik filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of personal jurisdiction. [R.00796] A notice to submit was not filed. 
Third-Party ·Defendant Daniel P. Kondos filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and requested an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 2013. 
[R.00801] On January 10, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed an opposition to Kondos' 
motion to dismiss. [R.00883] On January 27, 2014, Third Party Defendant Kondos filed a 
reply in support of his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [R.001100] On 
May 21, 2014, the district court entered an order that the disposition of Third-Party 
Kondos' motion was continued until he had sufficient discovery, and that thereafter he 
could request an evidentiary hearing. [R.01748] On January 5_, 2015, an evidentiary 
hearing was held on Kondos' motion. [R.03283] On April 28, 2015, the district court 
entered an order dismissing Third-Party Defendant Daniel Kondos. [R.04249] 
The IBN Defendants filed a renewed motion for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction against Plaintiff Steve Brazell on January 23, 2014. [R.01017] On 
February 6, 2014, Plaintiff Steve Brazell filed an opposition to the IBN Defendants' 
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motion. [R.0 1150] The IBN Defendants filed a motion to continue a preliminary 
injunction hearing without a date and to stay all other procedural matters, except Third 
Party Defendant Kondos' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on April 25, 
2014. [R.01671] On April 30, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the IBN Defendants 
motion to stay. [R.01681] On May 8, 2014, the district court heard oral arguments on the 
IBN Defendants' motion to continue the preliminary injunction hearing without date, 
[R.01720], and entered an order on May 21, 2014, striking the hearing on the preliminary 
injunction motion and did not reset a hearing pending resolution of outstanding discovery 
requests. [R.0 1746] 
On February 26, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed a motion to disqualify Plaintiffs' 
counsel. [R.01204] On March 11, 2014, counsel for the Plaintiffs opposed the motion. 
[R.01377] On March 26, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed a reply memorandum in support 
of their motion. [R.01515] On May 8, 2014, the district court heard oral arguments and 
entered an order denying the motion to disqualify on May 21, 2014. [R.01746] 
On April 18, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against the IBN 
Defendants. [R.01592] On May 21, 2014, the district court entered an order requiring the 
IBN defendants to file an opposition, if any, to the Plaintiffs' Rule 11 motion for 
sanctions within two weeks. [R.01746] On May 28, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed an 
opposition to Plaintiffs' Rule 11 motion for sanctions. [R.0 183 9] Plaintiffs filed a reply in 
support of their Rule 11 motion for sanctions on June 4, 2014. [R.01903] On September 
2, 2014, the district court entered an order on a hearing held on July 16, 2014, where the 
district court granted in part, and denied in part, Plaintiffs Rule 11 motion for sanctions, 
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and dismissed counterclaims against Plaintiffs except, Steve Brazell, without prejudice, 
and reserved the issue of monetary sanctions. [R.02323] 
On October 29, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 
with Prejudice (previously referred to as "Motion to Dismiss"). [R.02419] On November 
6, 2014, Defendant Von Whitby joined IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. [R.02475] 
On December 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. [R.02646] On December 10, 
2014, the IBN Defendants filed their reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss. 
[R.02698] On January 22, 2015, the district court granted the IBN Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss, with prejudice. [R.03594] 
On November 21, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss First Cause 
of Action with Prejudice ("Motion· to Dismiss First Cause of Action"). [R.02514] On 
December 1, 2014, Defendant Von Whitby joined IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
First Cause of Action. [R.02547] On December 2, 2014, Defendant Robert Riley also 
joined the motion. [R.02554] On December 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their opposition. 
[R.02666] The IBN Defendants filed their reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss on 
December 10, 2014. [R.02705] On December 17, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an objection to 
exclude items attached or referenced in the IBN Defendants' reply. [R.02954] On January 
22, 2015, the district court granted the IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, without 
specifically ruling on IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss First Cause of action. 
[R.03594] 
On Decem_ber 3, 2014, in response to IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion to Dismiss First Cause of Action, as well as Defendant Von Whitby's joinder in 
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the motions, the Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Amend. [R.02561] On December 17, 
2014, the IBN Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend. 
[R.02743] On December 29, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an objection to IBN Defendants' 
opposition and a reply in support of their Motion to Amend. [R.03053] On January 22, 
2015, the district court denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. [R.03594] 
On January 23, 2015, Defendant Von Whitby filed a Rule 54(b) motion to certify 
as final the district court's January 22, 2015 decision denying Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend, and granting the IBN Defendants Motion to Dismiss, which Whitby had joined. 
[R.03618] The district court entered an order granting the motion on February 10, 2015. 
[R.03679] On February 20, 2015, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. [R.03857] 
The parties stipulated to dismissal of Defendant Robert E. Riley, and the district 
court entered an order dismissing Mr. Riley on February 24, 2015. [R.03885] On March 
4, 2015, the district court granted a stipulated motion to dismiss Defendant Robin Nebel. 
[R.03955] 
C. Discovery 
On June 3, 2013, the district court entered a Notice of Event Due Dates, with a 
fact discovery deadline on February 18, 2014. [R.00125] On January 31, 2014, the 
parties filed a Stipulated Discovery and Scheduling Order, with discovery closing on 
October 10, 2014. [R.01124] The district court did not enter the stipulated order. On 
May 21, 2014, the district court entered an order requiring the Plaintiffs and the IBN 
Defendants to meet and confer in person concerning outstanding discovery obligations. 
[R.01746] On September 2, 2014, the district court entered an order that: (1) on or 
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before August 6, 2014, the Plaintiffs were to provide the information required by Rule 
26(a)(l)(A)(ii); (2) on or before August 27, 2014, the Plaintiffs were to identify any 
response to their request for production of documents they believed was unsatisfactory, 
and to identify any documents they believed that were improperly withheld; (iii) on or 
before September 17, 2014, the IBN Defendants were to identify all items of discovery 
they believed Plaintiffs had not been completely responded to; and (iv) the parties were 
ordered to meet and confer after the expiration of the above deadlines. [R.02323] 
On August 21, 2013, the IBN Defendants served their initial disclosures on 
Plaintiffs. [R.00399] The IBN Defendants served their first set of written discovery on 
Plaintiffs on August 22, 2013. [R.00406] Plaintiffs did not file initial disclosures until 
September 11, 2013. [R.00504] Plaintiffs supplemented their initial disclosures twice, 
once on May 28, 2014 and once on August 6, 2014. [R.01832, R.02205] Plaintiffs filed a 
Certificate of Mailing on September 19, 2013, [R.00509], but Plaintiffs did not provide a 
response to the IBN Defendants' written discovery until April 28, 2014. [R.01297] With 
the exception of Plaintiff Steve Brazell, none of the Plaintiffs have provided verified or 
signed answers to the IBN Defendants' discovery, instead they have relied on Plaintiff 
Steve Brazell signing for them. Plaintiffs have not disputed this. On August 22, 2013, 
Plaintiffs served on the IBN Defendants hundreds of requests for production of 
documents. [R.00406] In response, on or about July 11, 2014, the IBN Defendants 
produced more than 30,000 documents. On September 17, 2014, the IBN Defendants 
filed Statement of Discovery Deficiencies. [R.02390] After a meet and confer, IBN 
served Plaintiffs with revised discovery requests on November 13, 2014. [R.02498] 
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Plaintiff Steve Brazell finally responded to IBN' s revised discovery requests on 
December 17, 2014. [R.02735] On April 8, 2015, after wrangling with the Plaintiffs 
failure to produce documents, IBN filed a motion to compel production of the 
documents and for sanctions, which the district court granted. [R.04011] The district 
court sanctioned Plaintiffs and his attorneys with an award of attorney fees and costs to 
the tune of approximately $12,486.50. 
The parties took depositions, as evidenced by the many and varied notices of the 
same. 2 Plaintiffs deposed Defendant Robert Brazell and the IBN Defendants have 
deposed Plaintiff Steve Brazell. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should strike and dismiss Appellants' appeal because the Brief of 
Appellants does not conform to Rule 24(a). 
2 Plaintiffs filed an amended notice of deposition of Defendant Talos Partners, LLC on 
December 2, 2013. [R.00748] 
On February 5, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a notice of deposition of Defendant Robert Brazell. 
[R.01133] On February 10, 2014, Defendant Robert Brazell filed an objection to 
Plaintiffs' notice of deposition and demand for documents. [R.01189] On April 16, _2014, 
Plaintiffs filed another notice of deposition of Robert Brazell. [R.01584] On May 2, 
2014, Defendant Robert Brazell filed an objection to his deposition scheduled for May 6, 
2014. (R.01692] On June 6, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a notice of deposition of Robert Brazell. 
[R.01956] On January 12, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a notice of deposition of Robert Brazell. 
[R.03301] 
On June 26, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed a notices of deposition for Plaintiffs Tiffany 
Lowry, Craig S. Kagel, Mark M. Truncle, Jeffery D. Brazell, and Richard Schlesinger, 
with a notice of continuances of the same filed on July 7, 2014. [R.01992] On January 8, 
2015, the IBN Defendants filed a notice of deposition of Plaintiff Steve Brazell. 
[R.03293] 
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In any event, the Court should affirm the district court in all respects. The district 
court applied the correct standard under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
in denying Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. The district court properly concluded that (i) 
leave was required before Plaintiffs could file their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, 
(ii) the Motion to Amend was untimely, (iii) the Plaintiffs provided no justification for its 
unti'mely motion, and (iv) the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint was legally 
insufficient and, therefore, futile. 
The district court properly determined that Plaintiffs' Third and Fourth Amended 
Complaints were improper. Plaintiffs rely on a stipulation entered into by the parties 
setting a deadline to file amended pleadings. The district court did not enter the 
stipulation, nor did the district court adopt the stipulation in a subsequent order as to 
amending pleadings. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they conceded all prior 
iterations of their complaint were insufficient. Moreover, the district court concluded that 
not only was ~e proposed Fifth Amended Complaint legally insufficient, but that earlier 
versions of the complaint were also legally insufficient. Thus, even if the district court 
improperly determined that the Third and Fourth Amended Complaints were improper 
(which is not the case), the district court's error is harmless, in light of Plaintiffs' 
concessions. 
The district court properly determined that the Plaintiffs proposed Fifth Amended 
Complaint was untimely. The parties engaged in extensive discovery over the course of 
nearly two years. The only Plaintiff (out of more than 40) that has signed or verified a 
single written discovery response during that two year time is Plaintiff Steve Brazell. 
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During that time, Plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint on six different occasions. 
The Plaintiffs provided no justification for not having included the allegations and claims 
they proposed in earlier versions of their complaint. The district court was well within its 
broad discretion to find that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was untimely. 
Because the Plaintiffs proposed Fifth Amended Complaint failed to plead the who, 
what, where, when and how as to any single Plaintiff or any single Defendant with 
respect to their fraud claims, the district court properly determined it lacked the 
particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs have not pied in any version of their complaint "Constructive Fraud 
(Insolvency) Under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act" as Plaintiffs articulated in their 
third issue on appeal. Nonetheless Plaintiffs argue, for the first time on appeal, that the 
district court should not have applied the Rule 9(b) standard to the claim even though 
their fraudulent transfer claim does not allege either a constructive fraud or intentional 
fraud claim. In addition, and importantly, the Plaintiffs did not preserve this issue for 
appeal and, therefore, the Court should decline to rule on it. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Brief of Appellant Should be Dismissed 
Appellants' Brief should be stricken and the appeal dismissed for Appellants' 
failure to cite to the record. Pursuant to Rule 24(a),· an appellant's brief must contain, 
inter alia: (1) a statement of the issues presented for review, with either a citation to the 
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court or a statement of grounds 
for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court; (2) a statement of the case 
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in which "all statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record"; and (3) an argument "with citations to the ... parts 
of the record relied upon." See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), (7), & (9). Rule 24(e), in tum, 
provides the proper format for such citations. 
As stated in Rule 24 itself, "[b ]riefs which are not in compliance may be 
disregarded or stricken." Id. at Rule 24(k). This Court has recently reaffirmed that "(a]n 
appellate court is not a depository into which parties may dump the burden of their 
argument and research." Andersen v. Andersen, 2015 UT App 260, 1 6, 361 P.3d 698 
( affirming dismissal of amended complaint where pro se party's appellate brief did not 
contain appropriate citations to the record); see also Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, 
Inc., 2008 UT 82, iJ 20, 199 P.3d 957 ("We have made clear that this court need not, and 
will not, consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the record.") ( citations 
and internal marks omitted); Slaughter v. Anderson, 2006 UT App 5, iJ 4, 249 P.3d 570 
(refusing to consider inadequately briefed issues and observing that "[s]couring the 
record for facts to support an appellant's position is the role of the appellant, not the 
appellate court"). 
Appellants' Brief contains a "Statement of Issues," "Statement of the Case," and 
"Arguments," but none of these sections contains a single citation to the record. 
(Appellants' Brief. at 2-3; 3-12; and 16-28.) In fact, there does not appear to be a single 
citation to the record anywhere in the entire brief. Thus, despite having counsel, 
Appellants have laid upon this Court the burden of scouring the almost 6,000 page record 
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for the facts and procedural history that would support the Appellants' position. The brief 
--d should be stricken and the appeal dismissed on this basis alone. 
·~· 
In any event, this Court should affirm the district court's decision in all respects. 
B. The District Court Properly Denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
Under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a "party may amend its 
pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served ... 
[, o ]therwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court ... ; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires." Whether to grant leave to amend, however, is a 
decision that lies with the discretion of the trial court. Klienert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 
854 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Under that standard, the district court's 
decision should not be reversed because it does not exceed the limits of reasonability. 
See Caro/es v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, ,r 16, 79 P.3d 974 (citations omitted). 
The district court's denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend is reasonable given that 
it applied the three factors Utah courts have applied when deciding whether to grant a 
motion to amend: "( 1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the justification given by movant 
for the delay; and (3) the resulting prejudice to the responding party." Klienert, 854 P.2d 
at 1028; [R.03594-R.03599]. 
The district court correctly applied the foregoing standard and factors when it 
denied Plaintiffs Motion to Amend. [R.03 598] The Plaintiffs sought leave to file a sixth 
iteration of their complaint [R.02685-02691], and conceded that all previous versions of 
their complaint lacked the particularity required by Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. [R.02685-R.02690 at ,r,r2-3, R.03595 at 13, R.03598 at 13] Plaintiffs do not 
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dispute that the district court accurately stated that the case was filed in February 2013, 
[R.03595], that the Plaintiffs filed an amended answer before an answer was filed, and 
later obtained leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. [Id.] There is no dispute as to 
whether the Plaintiffs needed leave to file their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. 
Instead of addressing whether the district court's analysis of their Motion to 
Amend was proper under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs 
improperly argue that their Fifth Amended Complaint provides "fair notice" to the IBN 
Defendants, under Rule 8 and cite to Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966, 971 
(Utah 1982) and Blackham v. Snelgrove, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1955). (Appellants' 
Brief at p. 18) Plaintiffs' reliance on Williams and Blackham is misplaced. In Williams, 
the issue presented on appeal was whether a defendant properly pleaded an affirmative 
defense under Rule 8( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 969. The Williams 
Court analyzed the sufficiency of the defendant's affirmative defense under the "fair 
notice" standard of Rule 8 and referenced Rule 15(b) as to the sufficiency of pleadings. 
Id. at 969-971. The Rule 15(a) standard applicable to a trial court's discretion as to 
whether to grant Plaintiffs' Rule 15(a) Motion to Amend is not discussed nor analyzed in 
the Williams case. As such, the Williams case has no bearing on whether the district court 
abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend. Similarly, the Blackham 
case deals with whether a complaint provided the defendant with fair notice of the 
plaintiffs claim-not whether a motion to amend under Rule 15(a) was proper. 
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Blackham, 280 P.2d at 454.3 Accordingly, Plaintiffs reliance on the Williams and 
Blackham cases are not dispositive of whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Plaintiffs' Motion. The factors set forth above in Klienert are controlling. The 
district court properly applied those factors. 
First, the district court correctly determined Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was 
untimely. [R.03595] The district court reasoned that the Motion to Amend came "long 
after both the Court-imposed presumptive deadlines for amendments as well as that 
stipulated by the parties." [Id.] In addition, the district court found that granting the 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend would "substantially prejudice defendants as they would now 
be faced with new factual theories for which they have had no time to prepare." [Id.] 
Plaintiffs unpersuasively argue that the IBN Defendants "had ample time to prepare this 
matter for trial", and "completed written discovery to which they were entitled under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the rulings of [the district court]". (Appellants' Brief, 
p. 19.) Plaintiffs inaccurately state that the IBN Defendants "never sought the [ district 
court's] intervention as to any pending discovery nor did they put [Plaintiff Steve] 
Brazell or the Investor Plaintiffs on notice of their intention to do so though [sic] the meet 
confer process." (Appellants' Brief at p. 19.) The proceedings in this case are replete with 
discovery disputes, with IBN filing two separate statements of discovery issues, and the 
district court ordering the parties to meet and confer on at least two occasions. [R.00406, 
R.02498, R.01746, R.02323] In any event, the Plaintiffs' assertions do not aid them in 
3 Unlike the Plaintiffs' claims in this case-involving some 46 different plaintiffs-the 
Blackham case dealt with one plaintiff and one defendant, with specific allegations about 
the plaintiffs claim. Id. at 455. 
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establishing that the district court abused its discretion. Indeed, these assertions clearly 
support the district court's finding that the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend was untimely. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that when they filed their Motion to Amend, it had been 
nearly two years since they filed their first complaint. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the 
parties have engaged in extensive discovery on the allegations contained in their previous 
complaints, or that the injuries of which they complain occurred inore than seven years 
ago. [R.03595 at 1 4]; See Klienert, 854 P.2d at 1028 (holding that trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it did not allow plaintiff to amend her complaint for a second 
time in a three year old case about an eight year old injury, reasoning plaintiff knew the 
facts one year previously and could have filed an amendment then). The proposed Fifth 
Amended Complaint adds new parties, new claims and a new set of factual allegations. 
[R.02568-R.02640] To require the IBN Defendants to defend against new claims and new 
parties, which the Plaintiffs could have included in their initial complaint, their First 
Amended Complaint, or their Second Amended Complaint, is unreasonable and unjust. 
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend was untimely. 
Second, the district court properly found that the Plaintiffs had not provided 
'Justification for not having pleaded their multiple earlier versions of the complaint with 
the additional facts offered in the Fifth Amended Complaint-all the facts regarding the 
supposed misrepresentations and Plaintiffs' reliance thereon where plainly available to 
them from the start." [R.03595 at 1 4] Plaintiffs' silence on this issue is deafening, and 
telling. Plaintiffs cannot provide any justification for not including in their previous five 
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iterations of their complaint (which they admit were legally insufficient) the allegations 
and parties they include in their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed their 
untimely Motion to Amend in response to the IBN Defendants' Motion to Amend, and 
admit that they have failed to state a claim in all prior versions of their complaint. 
[R.02685-R.02690 at ,r,r2-3, R.03595 at ,I3, R.03598 at ,r3] In short, on the eve of 
dismissal, Plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint, adding new plaintiffs, new 
claims, and a new set of factual allegations that do not remotely resemble the facts 
alleged in any prior version of the complaint. The district court was well within its 
discretion to find that the Plaintiffs provided no justification for their untimely Motion to 
Amend. See Atcitty By & Through Atcitty v. Bd. Of Educ. Of San Juan Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
967 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying motion to amend where the amendment raised new issues, was 
filed two-and-a-half months after the discovery deadline, and both parties had filed 
motions for summary judgment). 
Third, the district court, carefully reviewed the proposed Fifth Amended 
Complaint, and concluded that the proposed amended complaint would be futile, finding 
that the Plaintiffs "still fail[ ed] to plead a fraud claim as to any specific plaintiff against 
any specific defendant with the particularity required by Rule 9(b)." [R.03595, p. 2, Para. 
4] See Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 2003 UT 57, ,r 33, 84 P.3d 1154 (stating 
that "a party may not amend a complaint to add a claim that is legally insufficient or 
futile"); Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, ,r 14, 28 P.3d 1271 (only a "sufficiently clear and 
specific description of the facts underlying ... [a] claim of [fraud] will satisfy the 
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requirements of Rule 9(b )") (internal citations omitted); Caro/es, 2003 UT App. 339, ,r 7 
(a fraud-based claim may be dismissed when the claimant fails "to recite [t]he relevant 
surrounding facts . . . with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to 
constitute [the fraud] charges"). 
The district court stated that the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint: 
is long on narrative and short on specifics with respect to each 
individual party. It does not explain when any false representation 
was made to any individual plaintiff, or any plaintiff's specific 
reliance on that statement. It fails to explain when each plaintiff 
obtained their respective shares or otherwise relied on statements 
made by defendants. 
*** 
The .Fifth Amended Complaint does not permit any one defendant to 
determine which supposed misrepresentation of fact was relied on by 
which plaintiff in what way, and why each defendant should be 
charged with that alleged misrepresentation. Rule 9(b) requires that 
minimal pleading before permitting a party to cry "fraud." 
The proposed Fifth Amended Complaint alleges a long course of 
supposed misrepresentations mostly occurring in 2006-2007. 
Nearly all of them are statements of future intent, or opinions as to 
value. A statement that an investment "is going to be huge" is not a 
statement of presently existing fact. If such intent was not genuinely 
held at the time of the statement, it might constitute an implied 
misrepresentation of existing fact, but the Fifth Amended Complaint 
makes no attempt to allege as such. Likewise a statement that other 
investments "have been secured" or a statement of intent to put one's 
own money into the venture is not false at the time merely because it 
did not happen. The Fifth Amended Complaint simply glosses over 
this principle, conclusorily alleging misrepresentations regarding 
forward-looking statements (and conveniently omitting any actual 
disclosure documents given to the purchasers). It is not too much to 
require plaintiffs to allege statements of existing fact, that the facts 
presented were untrue at the time, and how plaintiffs relied to their 
detriment on that misrepresentation. The Fifth Amended Complaint 
does not accomplish this. 
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[R. 03956, 112 and 3]. 
In an attempt to counter the district court's well-reasoned conclusion that allowing 
Plaintiffs to file their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint would be futile, Plaintiffs 
argue that the amended complaint "set[ s] out with a high degree of particularity each of 
the elements of a fraud claim" without identifying any set of facts for any one of the 
individual Plaintiffs that sufficiently describes who is suing whom and for what and why. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 16] The district court correctly concluded that the proposed Fifth 
Amended Complaint, "at its core, alleges, for the most part, supposed misrepresentations 
made by Defendant Robert Brazell to Plaintiff Steve Brazell, which plaintiffs alleged 
were passed along to all of them. A few other supposed misrepresentations are charged to 
other defendants, though the pleading fails to reveal these other statements of presently 
existing fact were false at the time." [R. 03958, at p. 4, ,r 3] Plaintiffs' conclusory 
statement that their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint satisfies Rule 9(b), without more 
is insufficient to establish the trial court abused its discretion. 
Next, Plaintiffs improperly argue against futility by raising for the first time that 
Rule 9(b) does not apply to their Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act Claim. [Appellants' Brief, 
p. 18] Plaintiffs have not alleged or put forth a claim for "Constructive Fraud 
(Insolvency) Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act", as articulated as one of their 
issues on appe~l, in their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, nor did they argue at the 
district court level that Rule 9(b) should not apply to either their proposed constructive 
trust claim (citing to Delaware law), or their proposed Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act 
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claim (which does not refer to constructive fraud). [R.0475, R.02518-02524, R.02646-
02659, R.02666-02673, R.02675-02678, R.02685-02691, R.02698-02703, R.02743-
02753, R.02944-02946, R.02954-02956, R.02959-02973, R.03002-03004, R.03053-
03061] Because Plaintiffs failed to preserve the issue of whether Rule 9(b) applies to 
their Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act claim, the Court should decline to consider it. See 
Seamons v. Brandley, 2011 UT App. 434, ,r,r 2-3, 268 P.3d 195 (per curiam) ("[I]n order 
to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way 
that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue") (quoting Easy Heat Inc., 2004 
UT 72, ,r 51 ). Plaintiffs have not put forth any reason why exceptional circumstances 
exist or that plain error occurred, as to why the Court should consider this issue 
notwithstanding Plaintiffs' failure to preserve this issue at the district court level. See 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r 11, 10 P.3d 346 (stating that the "preservation rule 
applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant 
demonstrates that exceptional circumstances exist or that plain error occurred"). 
Lastly, the district court properly rejected Plaintiffs' argument that they are 
entitled to file their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, because they allege that the IBN 
Defendants had not objected to the particularity of their previous complaints. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 20] The district court properly determined that the IBN Defendants 
had asserted the affirmative defense that the Plaintiffs' complaints failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted and that "Rule 9(b) applies from the start, [ and] does 
not merely contemplate an automatic 'do-over', if a defendant raises particularity." [R. 
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03995] In any event, because the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint is legally 
i> insufficient, Plaintiffs' argument on this point-however nonsensical-is moot. 
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend, because it properly concluded (i) leave was required, (ii) the motion 
was untimely, (iii) the Plaintiffs provided no justification for its untimely motion, and (iv) 
the amended complaint is legally insufficient and, therefore, futile. 
C. The District Court Properly Concluded That the Plaintiffs' Third and 
Fourth Complaint Were Improper 
The Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the IBN Defendants misled the court about 
whether the Third and Fourth Amended Complaints were proper. The IBN Defendants 
accurately identified the Notice of Event dates ( which does not speak to amending 
pleadings), [R. 00125], and that the district court did not enter the January 31, 2014 
Stipulated Discovery and Scheduling Order, upon which Plaintiffs rely to say that their 
Third and Fourth Amended Complaints were properly filed. 
Plaintiffs rely on the district court's May 8, 2014 order in support of their 
argument that the January 3 1, 2014 Stipulation was "adopted" by the district court. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 22] The May 8 2014 order related to the IBN Defendants' motion 
to disqualify, striking the previously calendared hearing on the IBN Defendants' motion 
for a preliminary injunction, continuation of Third-Party Defendant Kondos' motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow him to conduct further discovery, and 
the parties were ordered to meet and confer concerning discovery issues. [May 8, 2014 
Order entered on May 21, 2014] In that context, the order states that "the Parties' 
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Stipulated Discovery and Scheduling Order remains in effect and unmodified, without 
prejudice to the parties' ability to seek a continuance of dates as the discovery process 
continues." [R.01747-R.01748 at ,r 6] The May 8, 2014 Order to which Plaintiffs refer, 
speaks to discovery and an extension of discovery deadlines, but does not speak to 
amending ·pleadings. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on the order as an adoption of the Stipulation, which the district 
court did not sign or enter, is misplaced. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the 
district court ruled in a subsequent minute entry, dated September 16, 2014, that "no 
order authorized the filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint." [R.02389] Further, and 
most importantly, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they conceded in their opposition to the 
IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss that their prior complaints were insufficient, stating 
that the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint "will provide the Defendants with a fuller 
and more particularized statement of the Defendants' conduct ... [and that] [w]ith the 
filing of the proposed amended complaint the Plaintiffs will have met the requirements of 
Rule 9(b) and stated a claim upon which relief may be granted." [R.02685-R.02690 at 
,r,r2-3, R.03595 at if3, R.03598 at if3] 
Moreover, Plaintiffs inaccurately state that their proposed Fifth Amended 
Complaint does not add parties, or rather, the parties identified in the Third and Fourth 
Amended Complaint are the same as those that appear in the Fifth Amended Complaint. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 23] This is simply not the case. The Brooks Family Trust, Ronald 
Finken, Jennifer Mallas, Jeff Mallas, Jeff Rogers, Tina Rogers, and Jason Straub appear 
for the first time in Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint. Scott Day was in the Plaintiffs 
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initial complaint, [R.00001-R.00003], but not in the First, [R.00027-R.00029], Second, 
~ R.00367-R.00368], or Third Amended Complaints. [R.01316-R.01319] Connie 
Schellerup is not in the proposed Fifth Amended Complaint, [R.02567-R.02569], but 
appears in all prior versions of the Plaintiffs' complaint. [R.00027-R.00029, R.00027-
R.00029, R.00367-R.00368, R.02024-R.02027] Mark Warner appears in the Second 
Amended Complaint, but in no other versions of Plaintiffs' complaint. [R.00027-
R.00029, R.00027-R.00029, R.00367-R.00368, R.02024-R.02027, R.02567-02569] 
Simply put, Plaintiffs are confused about who is suing whom. 
Finally, even if the Third and Fourth Amended Complaints were proper (which 
they are not), this is of no import. Plaintiffs conceded that these versions lacked the 
particularity required by Rule 9(b ). Moreover, the district court concluded that "the Fifth 
Amended Complaint" and "earlier versions of the complaint" failed to cure the problems 
of pleading. [R.03598-R.03599] 
In sum, the district court did not err when it concluded that the operative 
complaint in this case is the Second Amended Complaint, and that the Third and Fourth 
Amended Complaints were filed improperly. But even if that is not the case, the district 
court's error, if any, is harmless because the Plaintiffs conceded these complaints lacked 
particularity and the district court considered all versions of Plaintiffs' complaint before 
granting the IBN Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ,r 
21, 80 P.3d 553 ("Harmless error is defined ... as an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected 
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the outcome of the proceedings.") (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 
796 (Utah 1991). 
D. The District Court Properly Concluded that the Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend was Untimely 
Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that they have been the "moving force as to whatever 
progress has been made in this matter". [Appellants' Brief, p. 23] That is simply not the 
case. 
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in February 2013, [R.00001-R.00003], and 
over the course of the next two years, Plaintiffs attempted to file five additional 
amendments to their complaint. [R.00027-R.00029, R.00027-R.00029, R.00367-
R.00368, R.02024-R.02027, R.02567-02569] Plaintiffs did not provide their initial 
disclosures until almost three months after such disclosures were due, and more than six 
months after filing their complaint.4 [R.00001-R.00003, R.00125] When Plaintiffs 
finally provided their initial disclosures, the disclosures did not list any witnesses or 
provide any summaries of expected testimony as required by Rule 26(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. [R.02242-R.02243] Although the disclosures listed individuals 
likely to have discoverable information, Plaintiffs did not list the subject of information 
each individual was likely to have, nor did they contain a computation of damages. 
[R.02391-R.02387] Nearly eight months later, Plaintiffs supplemented their initial 
disclosures twice, once on May 28, 2014, [R.01835], and once on August 6, 2014. 
[R.02205-R.2206] 
4 The IBN Defendants served their initial disclosures on Plaintiffs on August 22, 2013. 
[R. 00400-R.00401] 
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The IBN Defendants served their first set of written discovery on Plaintiffs on 
August 22, 2013. [R.00406-R.00408] Plaintiffs did not provide a response to the IBN 
Defendants' written discovery until February 28, 2014. [R.01297-R.01298] Importantly, 
with the exception of Plaintiff Steve Brazell, none of the .Plaintiffs have provided 
verified or signed answers to the IBN Defendants' written discovery requests, instead 
they have relied on Plaintiff Steve Brazell to sign for them. 5 
On February 28, 2013, Plaintiffs served on the IBN Defendants hundreds of 
requests for production of documents. In response, on or about July 11, 2014, the IBN 
Defendants produced more than 30,000 documents. [R.01563-R.1564, R.02963] On 
September 17, 2014, the IBN Defendants filed their Statement of Discovery 
Deficiencies. [R.02390-R.2397] After a meet and confer, the IBN Defendants agreed to 
and served Plaintiffs with revised discovery requests on December 15, 2014. [R.02963] 
Plaintiff Steve Brazell finally responded to IBN Defendant's revised discovery requests 
on December 17, 2014. [R.02963, R.02908-R.02916] The Plaintiffs failed to produce 
documents (relating to Plaintiffs' claims) that the district court ordered Plaintiff Steve 
Brazell to produce. The IBN Defendants had to file a motion to compel production of 
the documents and for sanctions, which the district court granted. [R.04015-R.04621] 
The district court sanctioned Plaintiffs Steve Brazell and his attorneys with an award of 
attorney fees and costs. [R.05515-R.05792] 
5 Plaintiffs do not dispute this fact. [R.0475, R.02518-02524, R.02646-02659, R.02666-
02673, R.02675-02678, R.02685-02691, R.02698-02703, R.02743-02753, R.02944-
02946, R.02954-02956, R.02959-02973, R.03002-03004, R.03053-03061] 
31 
The fact that only Plaintiff Steve Brazell has signed and verified the IBN 
Defendants' written discovery requests propounded to each of the Plaintiffs is illustrative 
of the IBN Defendants' frustration with this case: it is impossible to pin down the basic 
facts of who is suing whom and for what and why. Not only have Plaintiffs failed to 
provide any explanation as to why they have not been able to provide a legally sufficient 
complaint after six tries, but Plaintiffs have delayed this matter because none of them 
(except Plaintiff Steve Brazell) has responded to the IBN Defendants' written discovery. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that the IBN Defendants have delayed this matter is without basis 
(nor do Plaintiffs point to anything in the record in support thereof). 
In conclusion, the district court properly determined that Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend was untimely, and the Plaintiffs' bald assertion that it moved this case along is 
without support and unavailing. 
E. The District Court Properly Concluded that the Fifth Amended 
Complaint Lacked Particularity as Required by Rule 9(b) 
The Plaintiffs argue that their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint contains the 
"who, what, when, where and how" of the IBN Defendants' alleged fraud and 
misconduct. In support thereof, they cite U.S. ex rel. Sikkenga v. Rengence Blue Cross 
Blue Shield of Utah, 472 F.3d 702 (10th Cir. 2006). But that case does help them. The 
Sikkenga Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of fraud claims, because the 
plaintiffs complaint failed to satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) of the 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Like Sikkenga, the district court properly found that 
the Plaintiffs' proposed Fifth Amended Complaint (as well as earlier versions of the 
complaint) fell short of adequately pleading fraudulent claims, reasoning that the 
Plaintiffs complaint did not "allege statements of existing fact, that the facts presented 
were untrue at the time, and how plaintiffs relied to their detriment on that 
misrepresentation." [R.03594-R.39599]; Id. 
Plaintiffs, without citing to any paragraph qr page within their proposed Fifth 
Amended Complaint, allege, without attribution to any single Plaintiff or any singular 
defendant that they have satisfied the who, what, where, "."hen and how requirements 
stating: 
The "who, what, when, where and how" test was met in connection with 
1) the offering to S Brazell and the Investor Plaintiffs of the In-Store 
Broadcasting Holding, LLC membership interests through an In-Store 
Broadcasting Holding, LLC subscription agreement or Robann Ltd. or 
Robann Media, LLC; 2) merger and financing transactions inside IBN 
and Talas by Brazell, Whitby and Kasten; and, efforts to induce the 
Plaintiffs not to act on any concerns they may have had as to the 
conduct or course of business by Brazell, the IBN Defendants, Whitby, 
Kasten and Talas. 
[Appellants' Brief, p. 25.] See Caroles, 2003 UT App 339, ,r 27 (determining that it is 
improper to "essentially dump[] upon the trial court ... the burden of shifting through 
hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether plaintiffs have 'alleged ... 
facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud."') ( omission and second alteration in 
original) 
6 Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Rule 9(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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The foregoing excerpt from the Brief of the Appellant establishes that the 
Plaintiffs failed to plead a presently existing fact that was made to a single named 
Plaintiff, or by whom. Nor does it establish that any single defendant who made any such 
alleged representation knew it to be false at the time he or she made the representation, 
and how any single Plaintiff relied on any such fact. See Sikkenga, 4 72 F .3d at 729. The 
district court's decision is "spot on", when it found that the proposed Fifth Amended 
Complaint is "long on narrative and short on specifics with respect to each individual", 
and that "it does not explain when any false representation was made to any individual 
plaintiff, or any plaintiff's specific reliance on that statement." [R.03595-R.03599] The 
district court properly determined that the Plaintiffs proposed Fifth Amended Complaint 
(and earlier versions of their complaint) fails to comport with the pleading requirements 
of Rule 9(b ), and denied Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, and granted the IBN Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. [Id.] 
F. The District Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiffs Constructive Fraud 
(Insolvency) and Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act Claims 
The Plaintiffs articulate their third issue on appeal as follows: "Did the Trial 
Court Err in Applying Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) to Claims of Constructive 
Fraud (Insolvency) Under The Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act?" [Appellants' Brief, p. 3] 
Plaintiffs have not pied in any version of their complaint a "Constructive Fraud 
(Insolvency) Under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act" claim, or properly preserved this 
issue on appeal. (R.00027, R.00027, R.00367, R.02024, R.02567] The first time a 
constructive trust claim appears is in Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint, and then the 
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claim references the Delaware Limited Liability Act 18-607. [R.02024-R.0202 at 1193-
94] The first time the Plaintiffs allege a fraudulent transfer claim is in their Fourth 
Amended Complaint, which, in conclusory fashion alleges "Defendants Brazell, Whitby, 
Kasten, Talos and IBN have engaged in fraudulent transfers under Utah Code Ann. § 25-
6-1 et seq. the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act for which the Plaintiffs seek to have the 
transfers undone." [Id. at 1195-96.] These claims appear again, verbatim, in the proposed 
Fifth Amended Complaint. [R.02567, Exhibit A, pp. 68-69.] 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiffs have not pled a constructive fraud 
(insolvency) under the Utah Fraudulent Act claim, as they allege, Plaintiffs argument that 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should not apply to this non-existent 
claim, is unavailing, because (i) their proposed constructive trust claim references the 
Delaware Limited Liability Act as its basis for the claim, and (ii) their fraudulent transfer 
claim does not make a distinction between whether Plaintiffs are alleging a constructive 
fraud or intentional fraud claim. [Appellants' Brief, p. 26.] Plaintiffs rely on Wing v. 
Horn, No. 2:09-CV-00342m 2009 WL 2843342, at* 3 (D. Utah Aug. 28, 2009) for the 
proposition that Rule 9(b) does not apply to constructive fraud claims under the Utah 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. [Appellants' Brief p. 27.] While this may be the case, though 
the Plaintiffs admit this is an issue of first impression in Utah courts, the Court need not 
decide the issue because unlike the Wing case, wherein the complaint "[ o ]n its face, ... 
allege[d] both intentional and constructive fraudulent transfer claims," id. at *4, neither 
the Plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint nor their proposed Fifth Amended Complaint 
allege either an intentional or constructive fraud claim. [R.02024, R.02567] Thus, 
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because the Plaintiffs failed to allege a distinction between a constructive or intentional 
fraudulent transfer claim, they have either failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or 
failed to plead with particularity as required by Rule 9(b ). In either event, the district 
court's decision was well-founded. 
Moreover, if Plaintiffs have a claim for money damages for fraud, the IBN 
Defendants have no liability to Plaintiffs from which Plaintiffs may complain about 
Defendants' dealings with their assets and transfers they might have made. There simply 
must be some sort of claim for money, separate and apart from a fraudulent conveyance 
claim itself, for a fraudulent conveyance claim to have any remedial purpose. The point 
of IBN' s motion was that Plaintiffs have not pied any underlying claim which would give 
them standing to complain about a "conveyance" of Defendants' assets. 
Finally, the Plaintiffs did not argue this at the district court level, and, thus they 
tiave not properly preserved the issue for appeal. See Seamons, UT App. 434, iJiJ 2-3 
("[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court 
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue"). Further, 
Plaintiffs have not put forth any reason why exceptional circumstances exist or that plain 
error occurred, as to why the Court should consider this issue notwithstanding Plaintiffs' 
failure to preserve this issue at the district court level. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, iJ 11 
(stating that the "preservation rule applies to every claim, including constitutional 
questions, unless a defendant demonstrates that exceptional circumstances exist or that 
plain error occurred"). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's decisions in 
all respects. In addition, the IBN Defendants respectfully requests that the Court award it 
attorney fees and costs in defending this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11 th day of March, 2016. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER Maw-
John S. Chindlund 
Florence M. Vincent 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code §§ 25-5-1 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 
4823-1298-2831, v. 1 
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Utah Code 
25-6-5 Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before or after transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the 
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the 
debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
the debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining 
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (1 )(a), consideration may be given, among other 
factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or 
threatened with suit; 
( e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(f) the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value 
of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred; 
0) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the 
assets to an insider of the debtor. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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25-6-6 Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim 
arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if: 
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably 
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and 
(b) the debtor was insolvent at the time or became insolvent as a result of the transfer or 
obligation. 
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer 
was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was 
insolvent at the time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was 
insolvent. 
Amended by Chapter 61, 1989 General Session 
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25-6-7 Transfer -- When made. 
In this chapter: 
(1) A transfer is made: 
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest 
of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far 
perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable 
law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior 
to the interest of the transferee; and 
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far 
perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than under 
this chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee. 
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in Subsection (1) and the 
transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter, 
the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action. 
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in Subsection ( 1 ), the 
transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee. 
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred. 
(5) An obligation is incurred: 
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or 
(b} if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obliger is delivered to or for the 
benefit of the obligee. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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25-6-8 Remedies of creditors. 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the 
limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property 
of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil 
procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset 
transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the 
transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court 
orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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Effective 5/12/2015 
25-6-9 Good faith transfer. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a transfer or obligation is not voidable under 
Subsection 25-6-5(1)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably 
equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by 
a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(1 )(a), the creditor may recover judgment for the value of 
the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the 
creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who took for value or from any 
subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the 
judgment shall be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, 
subject to an adjustment as equities may require. 
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this section, notwithstanding the voidability of a transfer or an 
obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the 
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5( 1 )(b) or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer results 
from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the 
lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform 
Commercial Code - Secured Transactions. 
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a transfer is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-6(2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer 
was made unless the new value was secured by a valid lien; 
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured 
present value given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor. 
(7) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a transfer is not voidable under Section 25-6-5 or Subsection 
25-6-6( 1) if: 
(a) the transfer was made by the debtor: 
(i) in payment of or in exchange for goods, services, or other consideration obtained by the 
debtor or a third party from a merchant in the ordinary course of the merchant's business; or 
(ii) in payment of amounts loaned or advanced by a merchant or a credit or financing company 
to pay for the goods, services, or other consideration obtained by the debtor or a third party 
from a merchant in the ordinary course of the merchant's business; 
(b) the goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the merchant or the amounts 
loaned or advanced by the merchant or the credit or financing company in payment of the 
goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the merchant in the ordinary course of 
the merchant's business was of a reasonably equivalent value to the transfer, as provided in 
Subsection (8); and 
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(c) the transferee received the transfer in good faith, in the ordinary course of the transferee's 
business, and without actual knowledge that: 
(i) the transfer was made by the debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any 
creditor of the debtor; or 
(ii) that the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made. 
(8) For purposes of Subsection (7): 
(a) the term "merchant11 means the same as that term is defined in Section ?0A-2-104; 
(b) where the value of the goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the merchant, 
or where the value of the amounts loaned or advanced by a merchant or a credit or financing 
company in payment of the goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the 
merchant, was reasonably equivalent to the value of the transfer, the "reasonably equivalent 
value" requirement in Subsection (?)(b) will be satisfied regardless of whether the debtor or a 
third party received the reasonably equivalent value for the transfer; and 
(c) a transferee's receipt of payment from a debtor is not, and may not be used as, evidence that: 
(i) the transferee did not act in good faith; 
(ii) the goods, services, or other consideration were not provided by the merchant in the 
ordinary course of the merchant's business; 
(iii) the transferee had actual knowledge that the transfer was made by the debtor with actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or 
(iv) the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made. 
Amended by Chapter 459, 2015 General Session 
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25-6-10 Claim for relief -- Time limits. 
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this 
chapter is extinguished unless action is brought: 
vu (1) under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), within four years after the transfer was made or the obligation 
was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably 
have been discovered by the claimant; 
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b) or 25-6-6(1 ), within four years after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred; or 
-¢) (3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was 
incurred. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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25-6-11 Legal principles applicable to chapter. 
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including merchant law 
and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, fraud, 
misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, 
supplement this chapter's provisions. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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25-6-12 Construction of chapter. 
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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(j]) 
I 
25-6-13 Applicability of chapter. 
This act applies when any transfer occurs after the effective date of this act. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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25-6-14 Asset Protection Trust. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Creditor" means: 
(i) a creditor or other claimant of the settler existing when the trust is created; or 
(ii) a person who subsequently becomes a creditor, including, whether or not reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured: 
(A) one holding or seeking to enforce a judgment entered by a court or other body having 
adjudicative authority; or 
(8) one with a right to payment. 
(b) "Property" means real property, personal property, and interests in real or personal property. 
(c) "Settler" means a person who transfers property in trust. 
( d) "Transfer" means any form of transfer of property, including gratuitous transfers, whether by 
deed, conveyance, or assignment. 
(e) "Trust" has the same meaning as in Section 75-1-201. 
(2) "Paid and delivered" to the settler, as beneficiary, does not include the settler's use or 
occupancy of real property or tangible personal property owned by the trust if the use or 
occupancy is in accordance with the trustee's discretionary authority under the trust instrument. 
(3) If the settler of an irrevocable trust is also a beneficiary of the trust, and if the requirements of 
Subsection (5) are satisfied, a creditor of the settler may not: 
(a) satisfy a claim or liability of the settler in either law or equity out of the settler's transfer to the 
trust or the settler's beneficial interest in the trust; 
(b) force or require the trustee to make a distribution to the settler, as beneficiary; or 
(c) require the trustee to pay any distribution directly to the creditor, or otherwise attach the 
distribution before it has been paid or delivered by the trustee to the settler, as beneficiary. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3), nothing in this section prohibits a creditor from satisfying a 
claim or liability from the distribution once it has been paid or delivered by the trustee to the 
settler, as beneficiary. 
(5) In order for Subsection (3) to apply, the conditions in this Subsection (5) shall be satisfied. 
Where this Subsection (5) requires that a provision be included in the trust instrument, no 
particular language need be used in the trust instrument if the meaning of the trust provision 
otherwise complies with this Subsection (5). 
(a) The trust instrument shall provide that the trust is governed by Utah law and is established 
pursuant to this section. 
(b} The trust instrument shall require that at all times at least one trustee shall be a Utah resident 
or Utah trust company, as the term "trust company" is defined in Section 7-5-1. 
(c) The trust instrument shall provide that neither the interest of the settlor, as beneficiary, nor the 
income or principal of the trust may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred by the settler, 
as beneficiary. The provision shall be considered to be a restriction on the transfer of the 
settler's beneficial interest in the trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law 
within the meaning of Section 541 (c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
(d) The settler may not have the ability under the trust instrument to revoke, amend, or terminate 
all or any part of the trust, or to withdraw property from the trust, without the consent of a 
person who has a substantial beneficial interest in the trust, which interest would be adversely 
affected by the exercise of the power held by the settler. 
( e) The trust instrument may not provide for any mandatory distributions of either income or 
principal to the settler, as beneficiary, except as provided in Subsection (7)(f). 
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(f) The settlor may not benefit from, direct a distribution of, or use trust property except as 
stated in the trust instrument. An agreement or understanding, express or implied, between 
the settlor and the trustee that attempts to grant or permit the retention of greater rights or 
authority than is stated in the trust instrument is void. 
(g) The trust instrument shall require that, at least 30 days before making any distribution to 
the settler, as beneficiary, the trustee notify in writing every person who has a child support 
judgment or order against the settler. The trust instrument shall require that the notice state 
the date the distribution will be made and the amount of the distribution. 
{h) At the time that the settlor transfers any assets to the trust, the settler may not be in default of 
making a payment due under any child support judgment or order. 
(i) A transfer of assets to the trust may not render the settler insolvent. 
0) At the time the settler transfers any assets to the trust, the settler may not intend to hinder, 
delay, or defraud a known creditor by transferring the assets to the trust. A settler's 
expressed intention to protect trust assets from the settler's potential future creditors is not 
evidence of an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a known creditor. 
(k) At the time that the settler transfers any assets to the trust, the settler may not be 
contemplating filing for relief under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 
(I) Assets transferred to the trust may not be derived from unlawful activities. 
(m) At the time the settler transfers any assets to the trust, the settler shall sign a sworn affidavit 
stating that: 
(i) the settler has full right, title, and authority to transfer the assets to the trust; 
(ii) the transfer of the assets to the trust will not render the settler insolvent; 
(iii) the settler does not intend to hinder, delay, or defraud a known creditor by transferring the 
assets to the trust; 
(iv) there are no pending or threatened court actions against the settler, except for those court 
actions identified by the settler on an attachment to the affidavit; 
(v) the settlor is not involved in any administrative proceedings, except those administrative 
proceedings identified on an attachment to the affidavit; 
(vi) at the time of the transfer of the assets to the trust, the settler is not in default of a child 
support obligation; 
(vii) the settlor does not contemplate filing for relief under the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code;and 
(viii) the assets being transferred to the trust were not derived from unlawful activities. 
(6) Failure to satisfy the requirements of Subsection (5) shall result in the consequences described 
in this Subsection (6). 
(a) If any requirement of Subsections (5)(a) through (g) is not satisfied, none of the property held 
in the trust will at any time have the benefit of the protections described in Subsection (3). 
(b) If the trustee does not send the notice required under Subsection (5)(g), the court may 
authorize any person with a child support judgment or order against the settler to whom notice 
was not sent to attach the distribution or future distributions, but the person may not: 
(i) satisfy a claim or liability in either law or equity out of the settlor's transfer to the trust or the 
settler's beneficial interest in the trust; or 
(ii) force or require the trustee to make a distribution to the settler, as beneficiary. 
(c) If any requirement set forth in Subsections (5)(h) through (m) is not satisfied, the property 
transferred to the trust that does not satisfy the requirement may not have the benefit of the 
protections described in Subsection (3). 
(7) The provisions of Subsection (3) may apply to a trust even if: 
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(a) the settlor serves as a cotrustee or as an advisor to the trustee, provided that the settler may 
not participate in the determination as to whether a discretionary distribution will be made; 
(b) the settlor has the authority under the terms of the trust instrument to appoint nonsubordinate 
advisors or trust protectors who can remove and appoint trustees and who can direct, consent 
to, or disapprove distributions; 
(c) the settlor has the power under the terms of the trust instrument to serve as an investment 
director or to appoint an investment director under Section 75-7-906; 
(d) the trust instrument gives the settler the power to veto a distribution from the trust; 
( e) the trust instrument gives the settlor a testamentary non general power of appointment or 
similar power; 
(f) the trust instrument gives the settlor the right to receive the following types of distributions: 
(i) income, principal, or both in the discretion of a person, including a trustee, other than the 
settler; 
(ii) principal, subject to an ascertainable standard set forth in the trust; 
(iii) income or principal from a charitable remainder annuity trust or charitable remainder 
unitrust, as defined in 26 U.S.C. 664; 
(iv) a percentage of the value of the trust each year as determined under the trust instrument, 
but not exceeding the amount that may be defined as income under 26 U.S.C. 643(b); 
(v) the transferor's potential or actual use of real property held under a qualified personal 
residence trust, or potential or actual possession of a qualified annuity interest, within the 
meaning of 26 U.S.C. 2702 and the accompanying regulations; and 
(vi) income or principal from a grantor retained annuity trust or granter retained unitrust that is 
allowed under 26 U.S.C. 2702; or 
(g) the trust instrument authorizes the settlor to use real or personal property owned by the trust. 
(8) If a trust instrument contains the provisions described in Subsections (5)(a) through (g), the 
transfer restrictions prevent a creditor or other person from asserting any cause of action 
or claim for relief against a trustee of the trust or against others involved in the counseling, 
drafting, preparation, execution, or funding of the trust for conspiracy to commit fraudulent 
conveyance, aiding and abetting a fraudulent conveyance, participation in the trust transaction, 
or similar cause of action or claim for relief. For purposes of this subsection, counseling, 
drafting, preparation, execution, or funding of the trust includes the preparation and funding 
of a limited partnership, a limited liability company, or other entity if interests in the entity are 
subsequently transferred to the trust. The creditor and other person prevented from asserting 
a cause of action or claim for relief may assert a cause of action against, and are limited to 
recourse against, only: 
(a) the trust and the trust assets; and 
(b) the settlor, to the extent otherwise allowed in this section. 
(9) A cause of action or claim for relief regarding a fraudulent transfer of a settlor's assets under 
Subsection (5)0) is extinguished unless the action under Subsection (5)0) is brought by 
a creditor of the settlor who was a creditor of the settlor before the assets referred to in 
Subsection (5)(j) were transferred to the trust and the action under Subsection (5)0) is brought 
within the earlier of: 
(a) the later of: 
(i) two years after the transfer is made; or 
(ii) one year after the transfer is or reasonably could have been discovered by the creditor if the 
creditor: 
(A) can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the creditor asserted a 
specific claim against the settler before the transfer; or 
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(b) 
(B) files another action, other than an action under Subsection (5)0), against the settlor 
that asserts a claim based on an act or omission of the settlor that occurred before the 
transfer, and the action described in this Subsection (9) is filed within two years after the 
transfer. 
(i) with respect to a creditor known to the settler, 120 days after the date on which notice of 
the transfer is mailed to the creditor, which notice shall state the name and address of 
the settler, the name and address of the trustee, and also describe the assets that were 
transferred, but does not need to state the value of those assets if the assets are other than 
cash, and which shall inform the creditor that he is required to present his claim to both the 
settlor and the trustee within 120 days from the mailing of the notice or be forever barred; or 
(ii) with respect to a creditor not known to the settlor, 120 days after the date on which notice of 
the transfer is first published in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the 
settler then resides, which notice shall state the name and address of the settler, the name 
and address of the trustee, and also describe the assets that were transferred, but does not 
need to state the value of those assets if the assets are other than cash. 
(10) The notice required in Subsection (9)(b) shall be published in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 45-1-101 for three consecutive weeks and inform creditors that they are required to 
present claims within 120 days from the first publication of the notice or be forever barred. 
(11) 
(a) A trust is subject to this section if it is governed by Utah law, as provided in Section 75-7-107, 
and if it otherwise meets the requirements of this section. 
(b) A court of this state has exclusive jurisdiction over an action or claim for relief that is based on 
a transfer of property to a trust that is the subject of this section. 
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 284, 2013 General Session 
Page4 
@ Utah Code 
25-6-1 Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.11 
@ Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
·® 
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25-6-2 Definitions. 
In this chapter: 
(1) "Affiliate" means: 
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or more of 
the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly 
owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting 
securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities: 
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or 
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote; 
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a 
person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or 
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls 
substantially all of the debtor's assets. 
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include: 
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien; 
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under non bankruptcy law; or 
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process 
by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. 
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, 
secured, or unsecured. 
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim. 
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim. 
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim. 
(7) "Insider" includes: 
(a) if the debtor is an individual: 
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor; 
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (?)(a)(ii); 
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control; or 
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; 
(b) if the debtor is a corporation: 
(i) a director of the debtor; 
(ii) an officer of the debtor; 
(iii) a person in control of the debtor; 
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (?)(b )(iv); 
(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor; 
(c) if the debtor is a partnership: 
(i) a general partner in the debtor; 
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor; 
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (?)(c)(iii); 
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(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or 
(vi) a person in control of the debtor; 
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company: 
(i) a member or manager of the debtor; 
(ii) another limited liability company in which the debtor is a member or manager; 
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner; 
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(d)(iii); 
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or 
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, manager, or person in control of the debtor; 
(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and 
(f) a managing agent of the debtor. 
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or 
performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial 
lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory 
lien. 
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, 
organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, 
or any other legal or commercial entity. 
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, related by consanguinity 
within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an 
individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree. 
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or 
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes 
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance. 
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently 
obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 168, 1992 General Session 
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25-6-3 Insolvency. 
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at 
a fair valuation. 
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is presumed to be 
insolvent. 
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater 
than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets and the sum of 
the excess of the value of each general partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's 
nonpartnership debts. 
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or 
removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a 
manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter. 
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on 
property of the debtor not included as an asset. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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25-6-4 Value -- Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, 
property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied. However, value does 
not include an unperformed promise made other than in the ordinary course of the promiser's 
business to furnish support to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b) and Section 25-6-61 a person gives a reasonably equivalent 
value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly 
conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or 
disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security 
agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is 
intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous. 
Enacted by Chapter 59, 1988 General Session 
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(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's 
claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the 
transfer or incurred the obligation: 
{a) with actual intent to hinder, delay I or defraud any creditor of the debtor, or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation; and the 
debtor: 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining 
assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they became due. 
http://www.le.utah.gov/xcode/Title25/Chapter6/25-6-S5 .html 3/11/2016 
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a)(1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or 
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence 
of an organized association of persons that is made a party. A party may raise an issue as to 
the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the 
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity by specific negative 
averment, which shall include facts within the pleader's knowledge. If raised as an issue, the 
party relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the 
trial. 
(a)(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of 
an adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party 
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided, that when the true 
name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended 
accordingly. 
(a)(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of unknown parties. In an action 
to quiet title wherein any of the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the 
pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other persons unknown, claiming any 
right, title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the pleading 
adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions 
precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have been performed 
or have occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and with 
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence shall on 
the trial establish the facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official document or act it is sufficient to 
aver that the document was issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a domestic or foreign court, judicial 
or quasi judicial tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or 
decision without setting forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction 
shall be made specifically and with particularity and when so made the party pleading the 
judgment or decision shall establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a pleading, averments of 
time and place are material and shall be considered like all other averments of material 
matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be 
specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of limitations it is not necessary to state 
the facts showing the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause of action is 
barred by the provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or describing such statute 
specifically and definitely by section number, subsection designation, if any, or otherwise 
designating the provision relied upon sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp009 .html 3/11/2016 
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controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, on the trial, the facts showing 
that the cause of action is so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a private statute of this state, or an 
ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such statute or 
ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its 
passage or by its section number or other designation in any official publication of the 
statutes or ordinances. The court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
0) Libel and slander. 
0)(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary in an action for libel or slander 
to set forth any intrinsic facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the defamatory 
matter out of which the action arose; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same 
was published or spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is controverted, the 
party alleging such defamatory matter must establish, on the trial, that it was so 
published or spoken. 
0)(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for libel or slander, the defendant 
may allege both the truth of the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating 
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether he proves the 
justification or not, he may give in evidence the mitigating circumstances. 
(k) Renew judgment. A complaint alleging failure to pay a judgment shall describe the 
judgment with particularity or attach a copy of the judgment to the complaint. 
(I) Allocation of fault. 
(1)(1) A party seeking to allocate fault to a non-party under Title 788, Chapter 5, Part 8 
shall file: 
(1)(1 )(A) a description of the factual and legal basis on which fault can be allocated; 
and 
(1)(1)(8) information known or reasonably available to the party identifying the non-
party, including name, address, telephone number and employer. If the identity of the 
non-party is unknown, the party shall so state. 
(1)(2) The information specified in subsection (1)(1) must be included in the party's 
responsive pleading if then known or must be included in a supplemental notice filed 
within a reasonable time after the party discovers the factual and legal basis on which 
fault can be allocated. The court, upon motion and for good cause shown, may permit a 
party to file the information specified in subsection (1)(1) after the expiration of any period 
permitted by this rule, but in no event later than 90 days before trial. 
(1)(3) A party may not seek to allocate fault to another except by compliance with this 
rule. 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, a defendant shall serve an 
answer within 21 days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within 30 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party served with a pleading 
stating a cross-claim_ shall serve an answer thereto within 21 days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 21 days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the 
court, within 21 days after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion 
directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining 
claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the responsive 
pleading shall be served within 14 days after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading shall be served 
within 14 days after the service of the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) 
failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a 
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. 
If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, 
the adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting 
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to 
delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion-by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1) - (7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, 
whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule 
shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearings 
and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so 
vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may 
move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the 
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed 
within 14 days after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the 
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive 
pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 21 days after the service of the pleading, 
the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant. immaterial, impertinent. 
or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the other 
motions herein provided for and then available. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include 
therein all defenses and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the party shall 
not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in 
subdivision (h) of this rule. 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcpO 12.html 3/11/2016 
Page 2 of2 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or by 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 
defense of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim 
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial 
on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court w 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made at the 
trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made 
pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action resides out of this state, or is 
a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and 
charges which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the 
reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient 
sureties as security for payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security 
shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the undertaking as ordered within 30 days 
of the service of the order, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcpO 12.html 3/11/2016 
Page 1 of 1 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or. if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 21 days after it is 
served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse 
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 14 days after service of the 
amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express 
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause. them to conform to the evidence and to raise 
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time. even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is 
not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court 
that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
{c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose 
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such 
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted 
even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading. it shall so order. specifying the time therefor. 
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